ACCR

INVESTOR BRIEFING: MOVING BP FROM RHETORIC TO ACTION ON CAPITAL DISCIPLINE

Research* & 2026 shareholder resolution to BP plc

* All analysis, except for new material in slides 19 and 24, is based on our November & December 2025 and February 2026 publications.

March 2026

Sarah Brewin
sarah.brewin@accr.org.au

Alex Hillman
alex.hillman@accr.org.au

Nick Mazan
nick.mazan@accr.org.au

CATALYSING CHANGE
FOR A SECURE FUTURE

DISCLAIMER

This document has been prepared by the Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility Inc. (“ACCR”).

Copyright
Any and all of the content presented in this report is, unless explicitly stated otherwise, subject to a copyright held by the ACCR. No reproduction is permitted without the prior written permission of ACCR.

No distribution where licence would be required
This document is for distribution only as may be permitted by law. It is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or would subject ACCR to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction.

Nature of information
ACCR is not providing financial product advice. The purpose of this communication is not to provide financial product advice. Readers should consider obtaining independent advice before making any financial decisions. None of ACCR, its officers, agents, representatives or and employees holds an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL), and none of them purports to give advice or operate in any way in contravention of the relevant financial services laws. ACCR, its officers, agents, representatives and employees exclude liability whatsoever in negligence or otherwise, for any loss or damage relating to this document or its publications to the full extent permitted by law. This document has been prepared as information or education only without consideration of any user’s specific investment objectives, personal financial situation or needs. It is not professional advice or recommendations (including financial, legal or other professional advice); it is not an advertisement nor is it a solicitation or an offer to buy or sell any financial instruments or to participate in any particular trading strategy. Because of this, no reader should make any financial decisions without having obtained independent advice. By receiving this document, the recipient acknowledges and agrees with the intended purpose described above and further disclaims any expectation or belief that the information constitutes investment advice to the recipient or otherwise purports to meet the investment objectives of the recipient.

Information not complete or accurate
The information contained in this report has been prepared based on material gathered through a detailed industry analysis and other sources and although the findings in this report are based on a qualitative study no warranty is made as to completeness, accuracy or reliability of fact in relation to the statements and representations made by or the information and documentation provided by parties consulted as part of the process. The sources of the information provided are indicated in the report and ACCR has not sought to independently verify these sources unless it has stated that it has done so. ACCR is not under any obligation in any circumstance to update this report in either oral or written form for events occurring after the report has been issued. The report is intended to provide an overview of the current state of the relevant industry or practice. This report focuses on climate related matters and does not purport to consider other or all relevant environmental, social and governance issues. Any prices stated in this document are for information purposes only and do not represent valuations for individual securities or other financial instruments. ACCR does not represent that any transaction can or could have been affected at those prices, and any prices do not necessarily reflect ACCR’s internal books and records or theoretical model-based valuations and may be based on certain assumptions. Different assumptions by ACCR or any other source may yield substantially different results.

Rystad Energy is only responsible for asset level and economic data and is not responsible for any conclusions drawn from the data. ACCR retains responsibility for all assumptions pertaining to its modelling and any subsequent assumptions and errors.

Links to Other Websites

This document may contain links to other websites not owned or controlled by the ACCR and ACCR assumes no responsibility for the content or general practices of any of these third party sites and/or services whose terms and conditions and privacy policy should be read should you access a site as a result of following a link cited in this report.



OUTLINE

1. Why is a focus on capital discipline at BP so important?

2. Why is a focus on capital discipline at BP so timely?

3. Why are each of the resolution asks material?

4. What does this resolution aim to achieve?



WHY FOCUS ON CAPITAL DISCIPLINE AT BP?

- BP appears to be justifying its strategic pivot back to oil and gas by implying that an overly ambitious transition strategy drove its sustained poor financial performance.
- However, BP's chronic underperformance long predates its most recent pivot into clean energy (2020).
- BP is predominantly an oil and gas company. To “fundamentally reset” its strategy, BP needs to increase capital discipline in its upstream oil and gas business.

01.



BP'S CHRONIC UNDERPERFORMANCE PREDATES ITS MOST RECENT PIVOT INTO CLEAN ENERGY IN 2020

Energy has underperformed every other MSCI sector over 10 years[1, 2]



Source: Bloomberg Finance LP. Used with permission of Bloomberg Finance LP.

BP has delivered consistently lower returns than the sector and its European peers[1]



Source: Bloomberg Finance LP. Used with permission of Bloomberg Finance LP.

1. USD basis, all periods end on 30 June 2025. Over 15 and 20 years, the energy sector has underperformed every other sector, except for real estate.
2. Integrated O&G, and O&G exploration and production stocks, make up just over 70% of the MSCI World Energy Index as at October 2025.

BP HAS UNDERPERFORMED ITS SECTOR UNDER MULTIPLE RETURN METRICS

BP has consistently delivered lower returns on equity, assets and capital relative to the energy sector[1]



Source: Bloomberg Finance LP. Used with permission of Bloomberg Finance LP.

1. Values reflect BP's returns relative to the MSCI World Energy Index. US dollar basis and time periods end with the 2024 reporting period, using the simple average of annual returns.

AN OVERLY AMBITIOUS TRANSITION STRATEGY IS NOT THE PRIMARY DRIVER OF BP'S SUSTAINED POOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

BP's transition business has not been a significant consumer of capex or source of disposal losses and impairments



Source: ACCR analysis of BP disclosures (impairments) and Bloomberg data (capex).

"Our optimism in 2020 for a fast energy transition was misplaced and we went too far, too fast in our plans. We have now fundamentally reset our strategy. We are reducing and reallocating spending to our highest-returning businesses to drive growth..."[1]

- BP's then-CEO Murray Auchincloss, March 10, 2025.

1. Auchincloss, Murray. "How bp's simpler strategy will increase value for shareholders," *The Times*, March 10, 2025. https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/news-and-insights/bp-magazine/how-bps-simpler-strategy-will-increase-value-for-shareholders.pdf.

OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS, BP'S INVESTMENT IN UPSTREAM PROJECTS HAS GENERATED LIMITED VALUE FOR SHAREHOLDERS

The conventional upstream projects that BP has sanctioned since 2020 have a net present value (NPV) of $0.9 billion.[1]

Over this period, the company sanctioned $22 billion in greenfield capex.

If BP is to “fundamentally reset” its strategy, it needs to address its upstream oil and gas business.

BP's upstream projects have generated limited value for shareholders



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. NPV calculated using forward prices, Rystad cost and schedule, and a 10% discount rate.

WHY IS A FOCUS ON CAPITAL DISCIPLINE AT BP SO TIMELY?

02.



BP'S "FUNDAMENTALLY RESET STRATEGY" IS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF MAJOR STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP CHANGES



1. BP, "Climate Action 100+ resolution talking points".
2. BP, "From International Oil Company to Integrated Energy Company: bp sets out strategy for decade of delivery towards net zero ambition".
3. BP, "AGM 2022 poll results".
4. BP, *Net zero ambition progress update*.
5. BP, "Growing shareholder value: a reset bp".
6. BP, *Growing upstream – Oil & gas*.
7. BP, "Growing shareholder value: a reset bp".
8. BP, "AGM 2025 poll results".
9. BP, "Albert Manifold appointed BP p.l.c. chair".
10. BP, "BP p.l.c. Announces Leadership Transition".
11. Mooney, "Green investors threaten BP with legal action".
12. BP, *Notice of bp Annual General Meeting 2026*.

ALREADY ITS LARGEST AREA OF INVESTMENT, BP IS INCREASING UPSTREAM CAPEX



Source: Company disclosures, Bloomberg Finance LP. Used with permission of Bloomberg Finance LP.

THE IEA'S 2025 CURRENT POLICIES SCENARIO SHOWS A REDUCED ROLE FOR OIL AND GAS COMPARED TO THE 2019 SCENARIO

Oil and gas consumption in the Current Policies Scenario



Source: IEA (interpolated raw data).

BP’S HIGH OIL PRICE ASSUMPTIONS INCREASE THE RISK OF INVESTING IN PROJECTS THAT ERODE VALUE

BP’s Brent price assumptions will overstate their oil projects’ revenue by 16% relative to forward market price conditions, or 8% above analyst estimates.[1]

This could lead to a misallocation of capital into projects that do not meet BP’s expected return profile under forward conditions.

BP’s oil price assumption is 16% above forward markets and 8% above sell-side estimates[1]



Source: Company disclosures, Bloomberg Finance LP.

1. As at 30 October 2025. Sell-side estimate based on average price for 2028 which is the latest data available, converted to nominal 2030 dollars using 2% p.a inflation.

SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTION FILED BY ACCR, NEST, LONDON CIV, GREATER MANCHESTER PENSION FUND, MERSEYSIDE PENSION FUND, WALES PENSION PARTNERSHIP & PUBLICA

"Shareholders direct the Company to disclose how it promotes a **disciplined approach to capital expenditure** in order to generate an acceptable return on capital for **each new material oil and/or gas project** of the Company ('Project').

Such disclosures shall include an explanation of whether and how the Company:

1. assesses the **relative cost competitiveness** of each Project;
2. accounts for **cost overruns and delays** in project schedules; and
3. demonstrates how **continued exploration capex** creates value for shareholders.

These disclosures shall be made, to all Shareholders, by no later than the 2027 Annual General Meeting and shall include the principal criteria, data sources, methodologies and assumptions used to underpin these claims with reasonable detail, but without disclosing any specific matters which are commercially sensitive."

WHY ARE EACH OF THE RESOLUTION ASKS MATERIAL?

Capital discipline can mean a lot of things. Why this resolution focuses on:

- Cost competitiveness
- Project execution
- Exploration

03.



BP’S CONVENTIONAL GROWTH PORTFOLIO IS NOT AT A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

When assessed against assets that could make FID before 2035, BP’s conventional:[1]

- oil assets are, on average, more expensive than 53% of global pre-FID supply
- gas assets are, on average, more expensive than 76% of global pre-FID supply.

BP's oil portfolio does not have a cost advantage[1]



BP’s gas portfolio is high on the cost curve[1]



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data and company disclosures; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. Graphs only include assets with cumulative oil and gas resources greater than 30 Mboe.

BP'S RECENT $5 BILLION TIBER PROJECT IS MORE EXPENSIVE THAN 81% OF COMPETING OIL SUPPLY

BP's FID[1] of Tiber in September 2025 represents:

- a $5 billion commitment in a deepwater development in the United States
- an investment more expensive than 81% of oil supply that can reach FID this decade
- BP's largest FID in 2025
- a development with a 21-year gap from discovery (2009) to start-up (2030), assuming no further delays.

Tiber sits on the 81st cost percentile relative to other projects that can reach FID in the next decade[2]



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data and company disclosures; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. BP, "bp approves Tiber-Guadalupe project in the US Gulf of America," *BP News & Insights – Press releases*, September 29, 2025. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-approves-tiber-guadalupe-project-in-the-us-gulf-of-america.html.
2. Bubbles reflect BP's pre-FID assets with greater than 30 Mboe of potential production.

OIL AND GAS PROJECTS ARE, ON AVERAGE, DELIVERED LATE AND OVER BUDGET

Professor Bent Flyvbjerg study

Oil and gas megaprojects are, on average, **34% over budget.** 19% exceed budgets by more than 50%.[1]

EY

Assessed oil and gas projects were, on average, **59% over budget.** 64% of projects faced cost overruns and 73% reported schedule delays.[2]

ACCR

Eight Australian LNG projects that reached FID between 2007 and 2012 were all delivered late and, on average, **35% over budget.**[3]

Independent Project Analysis

Only 22% of assessed oil and gas megaprojects could "reasonably be called successful". The remaining projects had an **average of 33% cost overrun and 30% schedule slip.**[4]

Bain & Company

From 2015 to 2019, upstream and midstream oil and gas projects were an average of **2.5 years late and 17% over budget.**[5]

Poor execution could severely erode BP's project portfolio value[6]



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. Bent Flyvbjerg and Dan Gardner, *How Big Things Get Done,* (2023), p. 216. See slide 31 to compare to other sectors.
2. EY, *Spotlight On Oil and Gas Megaprojects,* (2014), pp. 4, 6, https://aegex.com/images/uploads/white_papers/EY-spotlight-on-oil-and-gas-megaprojects.pdf.
3. ACCR, *Australia's LNG growth wave – did it wash for shareholders*, (2023), p. 20, https://www.accr.org.au/downloads/accr_lnggrowthwave_271123.pdf.
4. Edward W. Merrow, "Oil and Gas Industry Megaprojects: Our Recent Track Record," *Oil and Gas Facilities,* (April 2012): p. 38, https://www.spe.org/media/filer_public/de/15/de15f740-fa58-4ca9-9383-ff54030f990f/153695.pdf.
5. Jason Housh et al., "Energy Transition: Delivering Capital Projects on Time and on Budget," *Bain & Company Brief*, May 2023. https://www.bain.com/insights/energy-transition-delivering-capital-projects-on-time-and-on-budget/.
6. See slide 26 for more information.

BP'S LIMITED DISCLOSURES DO NOT SUGGEST THAT IT DELIVERS PROJECTS BETTER THAN THE SECTOR

BP provides limited disclosures of its projects' cost and schedule.

Of the projects that reached FID, started up before the end of 2025 and disclosed a target start-up date, 61% started up late.[1]

For most of the projects, BP does not disclose a budget.

Of BP's seven "major projects"[2] that started up in 2025:

- two started up late (GTA and Mento)
- one started up in its target year (Cypre)
- we cannot identify a target start-up date for four (Argos expansion, Atlantis, Murlach and Raven infills).

We have not identified a BP-disclosed budget for any of these projects.

We identified 36 of BP's projects, of which 21 have a disclosed expected start-up year and came online by the end of 2025. These 21 projects represent approximately 63% of BP's total greenfield capex approved between 2015 and 2024. The remaining capex generally falls outside of BP's consolidated reporting, or was for assets acquired post-FID.

61% of BP's projects with a disclosed target start up date were late



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data and company disclosures; conclusions are ACCR's,

1. In this slide, the disclosures considered are BP's annual reports 2015-2024; percentages refer to greenfield capex of the project portfolio, as per Rystad Energy data.
2. BP, "Energy delivered: One year, seven big projects," *Energy in focus magazine,* January 14, 2026. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/energy-in-focus/one-year-six-big-projects.html.

ON AVERAGE, EVERY DOLLAR SPENT ON GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL EXPLORATION SINCE 2000 HAS DESTROYED 71 CENTS[1]

Value created / eroded by exploration

$8 NPV of discoveries made from each dollar spent on exploration



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. Calculated as the NPV of projects from FID, divided by the NPV of exploration expenses. Historic costs discounted at 10%. Future costs discounted at 10% plus country risk.

BP'S CONVENTIONAL EXPLORATION HAS BECOME LESS SUCCESSFUL AND MORE EXPENSIVE OVER TIME

BP’s conventional exploration success rates have halved for licenses awarded since 2010 [1, 2]

Conventional exploration success

75% of exploration capex



BP’s discovery costs are increasing [1, 2]

Exploration costs

$10 per discovered boe (RT25)



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. Values included modelled future costs and discoveries. Discoveries are calculated as total production.
2. The range is based on forecast exploration capex and discoveries relative to outcomes to date. The 2020s are included with the 2010s due to the uncertainty of future modelled exploration costs and discoveries.

BP'S NEW DISCOVERIES ARE NOT DELIVERING VOLUMES THAT COME CLOSE TO PAST DISCOVERIES, EVEN WITH INCREASING EXPLORATION EXPENDITURE

Discoveries made since 2000 only account for 20% of current production.

Each decade after the 1990s has delivered an even smaller proportion of production volumes than the last.

This is despite BP spending 2.5 times as much per year on conventional exploration in the 2000s and 2010s than it did in the 1990s.

80% of BP's current production was discovered before 2000



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

EXPLORATION BUDGETS SEEM DISCONNECTED FROM EXPLORATION INVESTMENT CYCLE TIMELINES

Global exploration spending has been closely correlated with oil prices[1]



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. Graphs use three-year averages.

BP'S "BIG" DISCOVERY MAY NOT DELIVER MATERIAL SHAREHOLDER VALUE

Last year, BP made its largest discovery in 25 years – Bumerangue.

Current data – which is likely to be updated as BP discloses additional appraisal information – suggests Bumerangue will generate:[1]

- $860 million of NPV under forward prices, based on $3 billion of greenfield capex and 1.6 billion boe of production
- $4.2 billion of NPV under base prices, based on $6 billion in greenfield capex and 2.3 billion boe of production.

Bumerangue (Phase 1 and 2) has a higher break-even price than 81% of global pre-FID oil supply that could reach FID by 2035.

On average, BP has spent $1.3 billion on exploration each year this decade. Under a forward price deck, this discovery could therefore fund BP's exploration costs for about 8 months.

Bumerangue is BP's largest discovery in 25 years



Source: Rystad Energy.

1. NPV incorporates all cash flows from 2026 and a discount rate that accounts for country risk (12.2%). Forward price deck has a $58/bbl Brent price (RT25; simple average from 2026-2050). Base price deck is Rystad's base with a $69/bbl Brent price (RT25; simple average from 2026-2050). Capex is present value terms, using the same base year and discount rate as for the NPV calculation. Inputs and calculations as at March 12, 2026.
2. Filtered on discoveries of > 300 million boe.

WHAT DOES THIS RESOLUTION AIM TO ACHIEVE?

04.



MARKET-BASED FORWARD PRICES AND REALISTIC PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS WOULD ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL FOR OVERSTATEMENT OF THE VALUE OF BP'S PRE-FID PORTFOLIO

We found that the apparent value of BP's conventional pre-FID portfolio[1] decreases by 80-85% when:

- adjusting from BP's price deck[1] to a forward price deck
- applying an assumption that projects will be one-year late and 20% over budget as project execution norms.[2]

All chart columns represent the potential value of BP's 263 pre-FID conventional projects that could make FID between 2026 and 2035.

Applying forward prices and project execution norms could reduce the apparent value of BP's portfolio by 80-85% when assessed using BP's stated 15% internal rate of return (IRR) hurdle



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data and company disclosures; conclusions are ACCR's.

1. The NPV under BP's price assumptions is uncertain because BP only discloses Henry Hub and Brent price assumptions, which we have extrapolated to the 28 different price strips that Rystad's tools use.
2. Relative to Rystad's cost and schedule assumptions.

MORE OPTIMISTIC PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS REQUIRE A HIGHER HURDLE RATE

Capital discipline is often framed through the lens of hurdle rates, with the idea that higher hurdles drive discipline.

But project assumptions also have a strong impact on which projects meet screening criteria. In some cases, they will have a greater impact on capital allocation than the hurdle rate.

For example, BP is expecting to generate a 20% IRR for its upcoming major projects.

If BP is screening projects with a 20% hurdle using its price deck, and a cost and schedule as per a commercial data provider's estimates, this would be the equivalent to screening projects for a 9% hurdle using forward prices and incorporating a 20% cost overrun and one-year delay.

The relationship between IRRs under different project assumptions for BP's pre-FID conventional portfolio



Source: ACCR analysis based on Rystad Energy data; conclusions are ACCR's.

WHY BP SHAREHOLDERS NEED BETTER DISCLOSURE ON CAPITAL DISCIPLINE

	 **Relative cost competitiveness**	 **Project execution**	 **Shareholder value from exploration**
Why it matters	Cost curve position determines competitiveness and resilience to a lower price environment. Sanctioning competitively disadvantaged projects risks value erosion.	Unrealistic assumptions on costs/schedule overruns risk a systematic overvaluation of pre-FID projects.	Exploration is a significant source of value erosion in the oil and gas sector. The average dollar spent on conventional exploration has eroded 71 cents since 2000.
Current state	BP’s conventional growth portfolio is not at a competitive advantage. Tiber is more expensive than 81% of competing oil supply.	Poor project execution (late and over-budget delivery) is prevalent in the oil and gas sector. BP provides limited disclosures of its projects' cost and schedule.	BP has spent ~$1.4bn/year on conventional exploration (2022-2024) and plans to increase exploration spend and “reload the hopper”.
Outstanding questions	What is BP's view of the competitive positioning of its pre-FID oil & gas projects? How do BP's capex decisions account for a project’s relative cost competitiveness?	What is BP's project execution track record? How does it integrate project execution assumptions into investment decision-making?	What is BP's view of the performance of its investments in exploration? Does the company’s exploration capex create or erode value for shareholders?

APPENDIX

01.



BP'S LARGEST PROJECTS THAT MEET ITS INVESTMENT CRITERIA AND ARE EXPECTED TO REACH FID BEFORE 2035

Project	Country	Field type	Start-up year	Final year of production	Total oil and gas reserves (Mboe)	Emissions ($MtCO_2e$)	Cost percentile[1]
Tiber, US[2]	United States	Oil field	2030	2064	358	153	81
Shah-Deniz, AZ	Azerbaijan	Gas-condensate field	2029	2061	322	104	97
Whale, US	United States	Oil field	2033	2057	168	70	46
Bu Hasa, AE	United Arab Emirates	Oil field	2034	2072	149	64	21
Asab FFD-2, AE	United Arab Emirates	Oil field	2029	2069	139	60	22
ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli Deep Water), AZ	Azerbaijan	Gas field	2029	2052	139	44	69
Kaskida (FPS), US	United States	Oil field	2034	2068	139	58	54
Frangipani, TT	Trinidad and Tobago	Gas field	2031	2053	107	34	70
Atlantic LNG T4, TT	Trinidad and Tobago	Gas field	2033	2054	86	27	75
Tangguh LNG Future Phase, ID	Indonesia	Gas field	2035	2064	30	9	81
Total					**1,637**	**623**	

1. Cost percentiles use oil or gas cost curves based on each project's field type.
2. FID reached in September 2025.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROJECTS HAVE MARKEDLY DIFFERENT LEVELS OF COST OVERRUN

When compared to other types of energy projects, oil and gas projects have, on average:

- larger cost overruns than PV, wind, transmission and thermal power generation
- lower cost overruns than nuclear and hydroelectric projects.



Source: Bent Flyvbjerg and Dan Gardner, *How Big Things Get Done,* (2023), p. 216.

EXAMPLES OF PEER DISCLOSURE

	Relative cost competitiveness	Project execution	Shareholder value from exploration
Peer disclosure example	TotalEnergies benchmarks LNG projects on a cost curve (Universal Registration Document 2024, pp. 288-289). 	Shell discloses project cost and schedule performance (Annual Report and Accounts 2024, p. 19). 	TotalEnergies discloses finding and reserve replacement costs (Factbook 2024, pp. 94-95). KEY OPERATING RATIOS ON PROVED RESERVES – CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES *(in dollars per barrel of oil equivalent)* | 2022-2024 | 2021-2023 Finding costs (1) | 2.9 | 2.4 Reserve replacement costs (2) | 13.6 | 11.7
Other examples	TotalEnergies: Oil projects (2024 Strategy & Outlook, p. 23). Shell: LNG projects (Capital Markets Day 2025, p. 27).		Eni: Well commercial success rate (Annual Report 2024, p. 52). Repsol: Exploration capex target (Decarbonization metrics and targets update, p.13). Woodside: Finding costs (2025 Annual Report, p. 300).

ACCR

THANK YOU

FIND OUT MORE

ACCR provides a range of leading insights through the year covering all major global sectors and markets. To get the best of ACCR straight to your inbox, signup for our newsletter.

E stewardship@accr.org.au
W accr.org.au

CATALYSING CHANGE FOR A SECURE FUTURE